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Abstract—One of the main reasons for the current interest in
quantum computing is that, in principle, quantum algorithms
can break the RSA encoding, the encoding that is used for the
majority secure communications – in particular, the majority
of e-commerce transactions are based on this encoding. This
does not mean, of course, that with the emergence of quantum
computers, there will no more ways to secretly communicate:
while the existing non-quantum schemes will be compromised,
there exist a quantum cryptographic scheme that will enables us
to secretly exchange information. In this scheme, however, there is
a certain probability that an eavesdropper will not be detected.
A natural question is: can we decrease this probability by an
appropriate modification of the current quantum cryptography
algorithm? In this paper, we show that such a decrease is not
possible: the current quantum cryptography algorithm is, in some
reasonable sense, optimal.
Index Terms—quantum cryptography, quantum computing,
optimality

I. F ORMULATION OF THE P ROBLEM
Why quantum computing. In many practical problems, we
need to process large amounts of data in a limited time.
To be able to do it, we need computations to be as fast
as possible. While computations are already fast, there are
many important problems for which we still cannot get the
results on time. For example, it has been shown that, in
principle, we can predict with a reasonable accuracy where
the tornado will go in the next 15 minutes, but at present, the
corresponding computations take days on the fastest existing
high performance computer.
One of the main limitations on the speed of modern computers is the fact that, according to modern physics, the speed
of all the processes is limited by the speed of light c ≈ 3 · 105
km/sec; see, e.g., [1], [5]. As a result, for example, for a typical
laptop of size ≈ 30 cm, the fastest we can send a signal across
30 cm
the laptop is
≈ 10−9 sec – during this time,
3 · 105 km/sec
a usual few-Gigaflop laptop performs quite a few operations.
To further speed up computations, we thus need to further
decrease the size of the processors. To be able to fit Gigabytes
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of data – i.e., billions of cells – within a small area, we need to
attain a very small cell size. At present, a typical cell consists
of several dozen molecules. As we decrease the size further,
we get to a few-molecule size, at which stage we need to take
into account the fact that for molecules and atoms, physics
is different: quantum effects become dominant; see, e.g., [1],
[5].
At first, quantum effects were mainly viewed as a nuisance.
For example, one of the features of quantum world is that its
results are usually probabilistic. So, if we simply decrease the
cell size but use the same computer engineering techniques,
then, instead of getting the desired results all the time, we
will start getting other results with some probability – and
this probability of undesired results increases as we decrease
the size of the computing cells.
However, researchers found out that by appropriately modifying the corresponding algorithms, we can often not only
avoid the probability-related problem but, even better, make
computations faster. The resulting algorithms are known as
algorithms of quantum computing; see, e.g., [2], [6].
Quantum computing will enable us to decode all traditionally encoded messages. One of the spectacular algorithms of
quantum computing is Shor’s algorithm for fast factorization
of large integers; see, e.g., [2]–[4].
The importance of this algorithm comes from the fact that in
the modern world, most encryption schemes – e.g., schemes
that underlie https, the backbone of the online commerce –
as based on the RSA algorithm, the algorithm whose crypto
applications are based on the difficulty of factorizing large
integers. To form an at-present-unbreakable code, the user
selects two large prime numbers P1 and P2 – that will form
his private code – and transmits to everyone their product
n = P1 · P2 that everyone can use to encrypt their messages.
At present, the only way to decode this message is to know
the values Pi .
Shor’s algorithm allows quantum computers to effectively
find Pi based on n and thus, to read practically all the secret
messages that have been sent so far. This algorithm is one of
the main reasons why governments throughout the world are

investing in the design of quantum computers.

and |1⟩ into

Quantum cryptography: an unbreakable alternative to the
current cryptographic schemes. The fact that RSA-based
cryptographic schemes can be broken by quantum computing
does not mean that there will be no secrets: researchers have
invented a quantum-based encryption scheme that cannot be
thus broken. This scheme, by the way, is already used for
secret communications.

1
def 1
|1′ ⟩ = √ · |0⟩ − √ · |1⟩;
2
2
see, e.g., [2], [6].
What is the geometric meaning of this transformation? By
linearity, the above formulas enables us to describe a linear
combination c′0 · |0′ ⟩ + c′1 · |1′ ⟩ of the new 0 and 1 states |0′ ⟩
and |1′ ⟩ in terms of the original 0 and 1 states |0⟩ and |1⟩:

Remaining problems and what we do in this paper. In
addition to the current cryptographic scheme, one can propose
its modifications which also serve the same purpose. This
possibility raises a natural question: which of these scheme
is the best?
In this paper, we show that the current cryptographic scheme
is, in some reasonable sense, optimal.

c′0 · |0′ ⟩ + c′1 · |1′ ⟩ =
(
)
(
)
1
1
1
1
c′0 · √ · |0⟩ + √ · |1⟩ + c′1 · √ · |0⟩ − √ · |1⟩ =
2
2
2
2
(
)
(
)
1
1
1
1
′
′
′
′
√ · c0 + √ · c1 · |0⟩ + √ · c0 − √ · c1 · |1⟩.
2
2
2
2

II. Q UANTUM C RYPTOGRAPHY: M AIN I DEA
Quantum physics: possible states. One of the main ideas behind quantum physics is that in the quantum world, in addition
to the regular states, we can also have linear combinations of
these states, with complex coefficients; such combinations are
known as superpositions [1], [5].
Quantum states: case of a 1-bit memory cell. For a single 1bit memory cell, which in the classical physics can only have
states 0 and 1 – these states are denoted by |0⟩ and |1⟩ – we
can also have superpositions c0 · |0⟩ + c1 · |1⟩, where c0 and
c1 are complex numbers.
Measurements in quantum physics. What will happen if we
try to measure the bit in the superposition state c0 ·|0⟩+c1 ·|1⟩?
According to quantum physics, as a result of this measurement,
we get 0 with probability |c0 |2 and 1 with probability |c1 |2 .
After the measurement, not only we get the measurement
result, but the state also turns, correspondingly, into either |0⟩
or |1⟩:
• if the measurement result is 0, the state will turn into |0⟩,
and
• if the measurement result is 1, the state will turn into |1⟩.
Comment. Since we can get either 0 or 1, the corresponding
probabilities should add up to 1.
So, for the expression c0 · |0⟩ + c1 · |1⟩ to represent a
physically meaningful state, the coefficients c0 and c1 must
satisfy the condition |c0 |2 + |c1 |2 = 1.
Operations on quantum states. In addition to usual operations with bits, we can also perform unitary operations, i.e.,
linear transformations that preserve the property
|c0 |2 + |c1 |2 = 1.
Walsh-Hadamard transformation and its geometric meaning. A simple example of a unary transformation is WalshHadamard (WH) transformation that transforms |0⟩ into
1
def 1
|0′ ⟩ = √ · |0⟩ + √ · |1⟩
2
2

Thus,

c′0 · |0′ ⟩ + c′1 · |1′ ⟩ = c0 · |0⟩ + c1 · |1⟩,

where
1
1
1
1
c0 = √ · c′0 + √ · c′1 and c1 = √ · c′0 − √ · c′1 .
2
2
2
2
If we represent each of the two pairs (c0 , c1 ) and (c′0 , c′1 ) as
a point in the 2-D plane (x, y), then the above transformation
resembles the formulas for a clockwise rotation by an angle θ:
x′ = cos(θ) · x + sin(θ) · y;
y ′ = − sin(θ) · x + cos(θ) · y.
1
Specifically, for θ = 45◦ , we have cos(θ) = sin(θ) = √ and
2
thus, the rotation takes the form
1
1
x′ = √ · x + √ · y;
2
2
1
1
y ′ = − √ · x + √ · y.
2
2
In these terms, can see that the WH transformation from
(c′0 , c′1 ) and (c0 , c1 ) is a rotation by 45 degrees followed by a
reflection with respect to the x-axis: (c0 , c1 ) → (c0 , −c1 ).
Comment. One can check that if we apply WH transformation
twice, then we get the same state as before. Indeed, due to
linearity,
(
)
1
1
′
WH(0 ) = WH √ · |0⟩ + √ · |1⟩ =
2
2
1
1
√ · W H(|0⟩) + √ · W H(|1⟩) =
2
2
(
)
(
)
1
1
1
1
1
1
√ · √ · |0⟩ + √ · |1⟩ + √ · √ · |0⟩ − √ · |1⟩ =
2
2
2
2
2
2
|0⟩
and similarly, WH(|1′ ⟩) = |1⟩.
Measurements of quantum states of 1-bit systems. According to the above description of the measurement process, if

we measure the bit 0 or 1 in each of the states |0′ ⟩ or |1′ ⟩,
then we will get 0 or 1 with equal probability 1/2. So, if we
measure 0 or 1, then:
• if we are in the state |0⟩, then the state does not change
and we get the measurement result 0 with probability 1;
• if we are in the state |1⟩, then the state does not change
and we get the measurement result 1 with probability 1;
′
′
• if we are in one of the states |0 ⟩ or |1 ⟩, then:
– with probability 1/2, we get the measurement result
0 and the state changes into |0⟩; and
– with probability 1/2, we get the measurement result
1 and the state changes into |1⟩.
In addition to measuring whether we are in the state |0⟩ or
in the state |1⟩, we can also measure whether we have |0′ ⟩ or
|1′ ⟩. In this case, similarly:
′
• if we are in the state |0 ⟩, then the state does not change
and we get measurement result 0′ with probability 1;
′
• if we are in the state |1 ⟩, then the state does not change
and we get measurement result 1′ with probability 1;
• if we are in one of the states |0⟩ or |1⟩, then:
– with probability 1/2, we get the measurement result
0′ and the state changes into |0′ ⟩; and
– with probability 1/2, we get the measurement result
1′ and the state changes into |1′ ⟩.
Main idea of quantum cryptography. The sender – who, in
cryptography, is usually called Alice – sends each bit
• either as |0⟩ or |1⟩ (this orientation is usually denoted
by +)
′
′
• or as |0 ⟩ or |1 ⟩ (this orientation is usually denoted by ×).
The receiver – who, in cryptography, is usually called Bob –
tries to extract the information from the signal that Alice has
sent.
Extracting numerical information from a physical object is
nothing else but measurement. Thus, to extract the information
from Alice’s signal, Bob needs to perform some measurement
on this signal.
Since Alice uses one of the two orientations + or ×, it is
reasonable for Bob to also use one of these orientations.
Sender and receiver must use the same orientation. Let
us show that if for some bit, Alice and Bob use the same
orientation, then Bob will get the exact same signal that Alice
has sent.
For example, let us consider the case when Alice and Bob
use the same + orientation and Alice sends the bit 0. In the
+ orientation, this bit is sent as the state |0⟩. Bob measures
this state with respect to the basis corresponding to the same
+ orientation, i.e., with respect to the basis consisting of the
states |0⟩ and |1⟩. According to the above general description
of quantum measurement process, this means that we represent
the measured state as a linear combination of basic states, in
this case as
|0⟩ = 1 · |0⟩ + 0 · |1⟩.
Then:

with probability |1|2 = 1, Bob will measure 0 (and the
resulting after-measurement state will be |0⟩), and
2
• with probability |0| = 0, Bob will measure 1 (and the
resulting after-measurement state will be |1⟩).
Probability 1 means that, in this case, Bob always get the 0
bit that Alice sent.
Similarly, if they use the same + orientation and Alice sends
the bit 1, Bob will always get 1.
Let us now consider the case when Alice and Bob use
the same × orientation and Alice sends the bit 0. In the ×
orientation, this bit is sent as the state |0′ ⟩. Bob measures
this state with respect to the basis corresponding to the same
× orientation, i.e., with respect to the basis consisting of the
states |0′ ⟩ and |1′ ⟩. According to the above general description
of quantum measurement process, this means that we represent
the measured state as a linear combination of basic states, in
this case as
|0′ ⟩ = 1 · |0′ ⟩ + 0 · |1′ ⟩.
•

Then:
2
• with probability |1| = 1, Bob will measure 0 (and the
resulting after-measurement state will be |0′ ⟩), and
2
• with probability |0| = 0, Bob will measure 1 (and the
resulting after-measurement state will be |1′ ⟩).
Probability 1 means that, in this case, Bob always get the 0
bit that Alice sent.
Similarly, if they use the same × orientation and Alice sends
the bit 1, Bob will always get 1.
The situation is completely different if Alice and Bob use
different orientations. For example, assume that Alice sends a
0 bit in the × orientation, i.e., sends the state |0′ ⟩, and Bob
uses the + orientation to measure the signal. In this case, if
we represent the measured state |0′ ⟩ as a linear combination
of Bob’s basis states |0⟩ and |1⟩, as
1
1
|0′ ⟩ = √ · |0⟩ + √ · |1⟩,
2
2
then, according to the general description of quantum measurement: :
2
1
1
• with probability √
= , Bob will measure 0 (and
2
2
the resulting after-measurement state will be |0⟩), and
2
1
1
• with probability √
= , Bob will measure 1 (and
2
2
the resulting after-measurement state will be |1⟩).
The same results, with the same probabilities, will happen if
Alice sends a 1 bit in the × orientation, i.e., sends the state
|1′ ⟩. Thus, by observing the measurement result, Bob will not
be able to tell whether Alice send 0 or 1: the information will
be lost.
Similarly, the information will be lost if Alice uses a
+ orientation and Bob uses a × orientation. So, the only
possibility for Alice and Bob to successfully communicate is
when they select the same orientation for each of the message’s
bits.

What if we have an eavesdropper? What will happen if,
in addition to Alice and Bob, an eavesdropper – who, in
cryptography, is usually called Eve – also gains access to the
same communication channel? In non-quantum eavesdropping,
if Eve has access to the corresponding communication channel,
she can measure each bit that Alice sends and thus, get the
whole message. In non-quantum physics, measurement does
not change the signal; thus, Bob gets the same signal that
Alice has sent – and so, neither Alice not Bob will know that
somebody eavesdropped on their communication.
In quantum physics, the situation is different. One of the
main features of quantum physics is that measurement, in
general, changes the signal. If Eve does not know in which of
the two orientations each bit is sent, she can select the wrong
orientation for her measurement. As a result, e.g., if Alice and
Bob agreed to use the × orientation for transmitting a certain
bit, but Eve selects a + orientation, then Eve’s measurement
will change Alice’s signal – and Bob will only get the distorted
message.
For example, if Alice sent |0′ ⟩, then, after Eve’s measurement, the signal will become either |0⟩ or |1⟩, with probability
1/2 of each of these options. In each of the options, when Bob
measures the resulting signal (|0⟩ or |1⟩) by using his agreedupon × orientation, with the basis (|0′ ⟩, |1′ ⟩), Bob will get 0
or 1 with probability 1/2 – instead of the original signal that
Alice has sent.
Quantum cryptography helps to detect an eavesdropper.
If there is an eavesdropper, then, with certain probability, the
signal received by Bob will be different from what Alice sent.
Thus, by comparing what Alice sent with what Bob received,
we can see that something was interfering – and thus, we will
be able to detect the presence of the eavesdropper.
Let us describe how this idea is implemented in the current
quantum cryptography algorithm.
III. C URRENT Q UANTUM C RYPTOGRAPHY A LGORITHM :
R EMINDER
Sending a preliminary message. Before Alice sends the
actual message, she needs to check that the communication
channel is secure, that there is no eavesdropping.
For this purpose, Alice uses a random number generator to
select n random bits b1 , . . . , bn – each of which is equal to 0
or 1 with probability 1/2. These bits will be sent to Bob.
Alice also selects n more random bits r1 , . . . , rn . Based on
these bits, Alice sends the bits bi as follows:
• if ri = 0, then the bit bi is sent by using the + orientation,
i.e., Alice sends |0⟩ if bi = 0 and |1⟩ if bi = 1;
• if ri = 1, then the bit bi is sent by using the × orientation,
i.e., Alice sends |0′ ⟩ if bi = 0 and |1′ ⟩ if bi = 1.
Receiving the preliminary message. Independently, Bob selects n random bits s1 , . . . , sn that determine how he measures
the signal that he receives from Alice:
• if si = 0, then Bob measures whether the i-th received
signal is |0⟩ or |1⟩;

•

if si = 1, then Bob measures whether the i-th received
signal is |0′ ⟩ or |1′ ⟩.

Checking for eavesdroppers. After this, for k out of n bits,
Alice openly sends to Bob her bits bi and her orientations ri ,
and Bob sends to Alice his orientations si and the signals b′i
that he measured.
In half of the cases, the orientations ri and si should
coincide, in which case, if there is no eavesdropper, the signal
b′i measured by Bob should coincide with the signal bi that
Alice sent. So, if b′i ̸= bi for some i, this means that there is
an eavesdropper.
If there is an eavesdropper, then with probability 1/2, Eve
will select a different orientation. In half of such cases, the
eavesdropping with change the original signal. So, for each
bit, the probability that we will have b′i ̸= bi (and thus, that
the eavesdropper will be detected) is equal to 1/4. Thus, the
probability that the eavesdropper will not be detected by this
bit is 1 − 1/4 = 3/4. The probability that Eve will not be
detected in all k/2 cases is thus equal to the product of k/2
such probabilities, i.e., to (3/4)k/2 . For a sufficiently large k,
this probability of not-detecting-eavesdropping is very small.
Thus, if b′i = bi for all k bits i, this means that with
high confidence, there is no eavesdropping: the communication
channel between Alice and Bob is secure.
Preparing to send a message. Now, for each of the remaining
(n − k) bits, Alice and Bob openly exchange orientations ri
and si . For half of these bits, these orientations must coincide.
For these bits, since there is no eavesdropping, Alice and Bob
know that the signal b′i measured by Bob is the same as the
def
signal bi sent to Alice. So, there are B = (n − k)/2 bits
′
bi = bi that they both know but no one else knows.
Sending the actual message. Now, Alice takes the B-bit message m1 , . . . , mB that she wants to send, forms the encoded
def
message m′i = mi ⊕ bi , where ⊕ means addition modulo 2
(or, equivalently, exclusive or), and openly sends the encoded
message m′i .
Receiving the actual message. Upon receiving the message
m′i , Bob reconstructs the original message as mi = m′i ⊕ bi .
IV. A G ENERAL FAMILY OF Q UANTUM C RYPTOGRAPHY
A LGORITHMS : D ESCRIPTION
In the current quantum cryptography algorithm, Alice selects one of the possible two orientations + and × with
probability 0.5. Similarly, Bob selects one of the two possible
orientations + and × with probability 0.5.
It is therefore reasonable to consider a more general scheme,
in which:
•

Alice selects the orientation + with some probability
a+ (which is not necessarily equal to 0.5) and, correspondingly, the other orientation × with the remaining
probability a× = 1 − a+ ; and

Bob select the orientation + with some probability b+
(which is not necessarily equal to 0.5) and, correspondingly, the other orientation × with the remaining probability b× = 1 − b+ .
A natural question is: which probabilities a+ and b+ should
they choose to make the connection maximally secure, i.e., to
maximize the probability of detecting the eavesdropper?
•

V. P ROVING T HAT THE C URRENT Q UANTUM
C RYPTOGRAPHY A LGORITHM I S O PTIMAL
What do we want to maximize? We want to maximize the
probability of detecting an eavesdropper. The eavesdropper
also selects one of the two orientations + or ×. Let e+
be the probability with which the eavesdropper (Eve) select
the orientation +, then Eve will select × with the remaining
probability e× = 1 − e+ .
As we have seen from the description of the current algorithms, Alice and Bob can only use bits for which their
selected orientations coincide, because in this case, the message bit remains unchanged. If in this case, it so happens that
Eve selects the same orientation, then her observation will also
not change this bit, and thus, we will not be able to detect the
eavesdropping.
The only case when we can detect the eavesdropping is
when Alice and Bob have the same orientation, but Eve has a
different one. There are two such cases:
• the first case is when Alice and Bob select + and Eve
selects ×;
• the second case is when Alice and Bob select × and Eve
selects +.
Alice, Bob, and Eve act independently, thus, the probability p1
of the first case is equal to the product of the probabilities that
Alice selects +, that Bob selects +, and that Eve selects ×:
p1 = a+ · b+ · e× .
Similarly, the probability p2 of the second case is equal to
the product of the probabilities that Alice selects ×, that Bob
selects ×, and that Eve selects +:
p2 = a× · b× · e+ .
These two cases are incompatible, so the overall probability p
of detecting the eavesdropper is equal to the sum of the above
two probabilities:
p = a+ · b+ · e× + a× · b× · e+ .
Taking into account that a× = 1 − a+ , b× = 1 − b+ , and
e× = 1 − e+ , we conclude that this detection probability takes
the form
p = a+ · b+ · (1 − e+ ) + (1 − a+ ) · (1 − b+ ) · e+ .

(1)

This probability depends on Eve’s selection e+ . As typical
in game-theoretic situations, we would like to maximize the
probability of detection in the worst case for us, when Eve uses
her best strategy. Eve’s strategy is to minimize the detection
probability (1). So, we want to find the values a+ and b+ for

which the minimum of the expression (1) over all possible
values e+ is the largest possible. In other words, we want to
maximize the following expression:
J = min {a+ · b+ · (1 − e+ ) + (1 − a+ ) · (1 − b+ ) · e+ }. (2)
e+ ∈[0,1]

Let us analyze the resulting optimization problem. One
can easily see that, once the values a+ and b+ are fixed, the
expression (1) that Eve wants to minimize is a linear function
of e+ : namely, it can be described as
p = a+ · b+ − a+ · b+ · e+ + (1 − a+ ) · (1 − b+ ) · e+ =
a+ · b+ + e+ · ((1 − a+ ) · (1 − b+ ) − a+ · b+ ).
We want to minimize this expression over all possible values
of e+ from the interval [0, 1]. It is known that a linear function
on an interval always attains its smallest possible value at
one of the endpoints. Thus, to find the minimum of the
above expression over e+ , it is sufficient to consider the two
endpoints e+ = 0 and e+ = 1 of this interval, and takes the
smallest of the resulting two values.
For e+ = 0, the expression (1) becomes a+ · b+ . For
e+ = 1, the expression (1) becomes (1 − a+ ) · (1 − b+ ). Thus,
the minimum (2) of the expression (1) can be equivalently
described as:
J = min{a+ · b+ , (1 − a+ ) · (1 − b+ )}.

(3)

We need to find the values a+ and b+ for which this quantity
attains its largest possible value.
Let us first, for each a+ , find the value b+ for which
the expression (3) attains its maximum possible value. In
the formula (3), the first of the two expressions, namely, the
expression a+ ·b+ , is increasing from 0 to a+ as b+ goes from
0 to 1. The second expression (1 − a+ ) · (1 − b+ ) decreases
from 1 − a+ to 0 as b+ goes from 0 to 1. Thus:
• for small b+ , the first of the two expressions is smaller,
thus for these b+ , the function (3) is equal to the first
expression J = a+ · b+ and is, thus, increasing with b+ ;
• for larger b+ , the second of the two expressions is smaller,
thus for these b+ , the function (3) is equal to the second
expression J = (1−a+ )·(1−b+ ) and is, thus, decreasing
with b+ .
Since the expression (3) first increases and then decreases,
its maximum is attained at a point when the expression (3)
switches from increasing to decreasing, i.e., at a point b+ at
which the two products that form the expression (3) are equal:
a+ · b+ = (1 − b+ ) · (1 − a+ ).
If we open the parentheses, we conclude that
a+ · b+ = 1 − a+ − b+ + a+ · b+ .
Subtracting a+ · b+ from both sides of this equality, we get
0 = 1 − a+ − b+ , thus b+ = 1 − a+ .

Substituting this expression for b+ into the formula (3), we
conclude that
J = min{a+ · (1 − a+ ), (1 − a+ ) · a+ },
i.e., that J = a+ · (1 − a+ ). We want to find the value a+ that
maximizes this expression. To find this value, we differentiate
this expression with respect to a+ and equate the resulting
derivative to 0. As a result, we get the equation 1 − 2a+ = 0,
hence a+ = 0.5. Since b+ = 1 − a+ , we get
b+ = 1 − 0.5 = 0.5.
Thus, the current quantum cryptography algorithm is indeed
optimal.
Comment. Similar arguments show:
• that the best is to use 45 degrees rotation, and
• that the best is to have 0s and 1s in bi with probability 0.5.
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